Each month the Scattered Clouds blog takes a look at the wonderful world of tourism through a data and evidence-led lens, all in pursuit of transforming tourism sector data into insight of course!

Torrid Twenties - April 2026

Back in March 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, I titled my monthly blog “Torrid Twenties”, reflecting the fact that the decade was posing an endless series of challenges for the tourism sector.

So here we are four years and one month later and it is apposite to recycle that blog title, this time thanks to the US-Israeli war with Iran and its regional proxies.

I’m conscious of the fact that I’m writing this at the end of March, and it’s entirely possible the situation will have changed considerably before we more than a week or so into April, but nonetheless it is worth taking stock of the short-term and potential longer-term consequences of the conflict on inbound and domestic tourism.

Starting with the short-term, where the most notable impact is that the travel plans of tens of thousands of both inbound and outbound travellers have been thrown into chaos, with frequent short-notice airspace closures in the Middle East and the big three Middle East airlines, Emirates, Qatar Airways and Etihad, operating a reduced schedule.

The number of flights has increased since the early days of March, but with many travellers connecting in Dubai, Doha or Abu Dhabi as opposed to having that as their ultimate origin or destination, the prospects of someone’s itinerary being entirely unaffected is still remote. Add to that the fact that the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office advice is to avoid all but essential travel to the Middle East then those who do travel may find their travel insurance will not cover them should a conflict-related incident disrupt their trip.

In 2025 the number of passengers (inbound, outbound and transfer) arriving or departing UK airports on flights from or to Dubai stood at 6,372,922, with the equivalent figures for Doha and Abu Dhabi being 3,739,282 and 1,540,073, with more than one million additional passengers flying to or from Bahrain and Kuwait. This paints a picture of just how vital airports in the Middle East have become, with the combined tally representing 5% of all international passenger movements at UK airports last year. A huge proportion of those travellers these statistics relate to will have been making journeys between Britain and parts of South Asia, Southeast Asia or Australasia, not just the Gulf itself.

European and Asian airlines have insufficient spare capacity (planes or crew) to compensate for this reduction in available seats, although the likes of British Airways, Qantas, Malaysian Airlines and Singapore Airlines have all tweaked their schedules to operate some additional flights.

Be in no doubt that Britain will welcome fewer inbound visitors from these regions in March and April of this year than would have been expected at the end of February. Equally there will be Brits who have not made a planned outbound journey due to flight cancellations, but we might be kidding ourselves if we think every penny of a refund they are entitled to will be spent on a domestic holiday instead.

For those living in the Gulf, Asia and Australasia who were planning, but had not yet booked, a trip to Britain later in the year there is somewhat of a dilemma; do they seek out an alternate air route that doesn’t involve flying via the Middle East hubs, potentially with a much higher ticket price, or do they opt to visit another destination that’s more straightforward to reach?

The price of air tickets between Britain and destinations where a substantial chunk of demand would have involved travel via the Middle East are rising not just down to the basics of supply and demand, but due to the spiralling cost of jet fuel, which for the typical airline represents about one-quarter of operating costs.

According to the IATA Jet Fuel Price Monitor, a barrel of jet fuel cost 96% more in the week ending 27 March than in the week ending 27 February. European airlines source around one-third of their jet fuel form the Middle East and while it’s understandable that airlines are not broadcasting this fact there is a genuine possibility of shortages of jet fuel within the next month or two if safe passage through the Straits of Hormuz remains impeded.

Even if hostilities ceased tomorrow it’s not entirely clear the extent to which production facilities in the region will be able to restart full production, meaning that supply might be constrained for longer than just the duration of the war itself.

Many economists have been saying that any spike in inflation will simply be a short-lived blip. I’m a bit sceptical about that, in part down to the uncertainty regarding the duration of the conflict and the time it will take for energy production to fully restart and supply chains to be fully up and running, but also because it’s not just oil and gas supplies that have been curtailed.

Ammonia and urea (not words I thought I’d write in one of these blogs) are vital to the production of fertilizers, and the agricultural sector relies on supplies from the Gulf, which, at present, are not able to be shipped.

The upshot of this is that less fertilizer will be available for the main planting season for crops such as rice and maize in Asia, and crops such as corn, potatoes, and various other vegetables in Europe. Less fertilizer means lower crop yields. Lower crop yields will result in the supply of foodstuffs being lower than they otherwise would have been, and in turn prices will be higher.

Given that what is planted in spring doesn’t normally end up on supermarket shelves until the autumn is why I fear inflation may stay higher for longer than some economists reckon.

Higher inflation, especially when it relates to essentials such as fuel, energy and food that account for a substantial chunk of our weekly spending, leads to a squeeze on everyone’s disposable income, and adjustments have to be made, which may encompass spending less on discretionary items including travel and tourism.

Yes, there is an argument to say that domestic tourism may get a boost if airfares rise dramatically in the next few months and/or jet fuel shortages lead to fewer flights, but those hellbent on a foreign holiday might simply search for destinations far away from the conflict zone that are easy and affordable to reach.

The pressure on airlines bottom lines will perhaps not become evident until later in the year. It’s normally in September or October that we hear of at least one European airline failing due to it having insufficient cash reserves to make it through the upcoming lean winter period, and it would be astounding if this annual ritual is avoided this autumn.

Even if some foreign travel ends up being domestic travel instead, we should recognise that domestic travel itself will be impacted by higher costs, most notably petrol. It is realistic to suppose that domestic destinations, whether for an overnight trip or simply a day out, that involve a comparatively short journey will be more appealing than those that require a lengthy, and therefore costly, car journey. Any such adaptation in consumer behaviour would be to the detriment of Britain’s more far-flung destinations.

In the Australian states of Victoria and Tasmania it has been announced that public transport will be free for at least the month of April to help preserve fuel supplies and discourage car use. I don’t envisage this idea being adopted in Britain, but I’d happily be proved wrong.

UK consumer confidence fell in March and will likely do so again in April unless a swift and comprehensive end to the war emerges. Weak consumer confidence in and of itself doesn’t preclude people spending on travel and tourism, but it can lead to the prioritisation of the “main holiday” at the expense of more regular short-breaks or days out.

It’s not just purchases of tourism related goods and services that might get reined in, it’s general spending on stuff, and this of course can lead to a slowing in economic growth, not that growth was all that spectacular to begin with. Reduced spending by consumers and reduced profits for businesses further erodes government tax receipts at a time when additional demands on public spending are emerging, not least higher bond yields on government gilts, a topic I mused on in my blog last October.

All of this means the amount of public money, whether at the central or local government level, available to support the visitor economy is set to be squeezed yet again, and the prospect of lower taxes drifts ever further into the distance.

We should of course recognise the human suffering that has resulted from the conflict, but it is also true to say that there has been substantial reputational damage done to the Gulf states that have spent billions over the past few decades in diversifying their economies and attracting both international tourists and foreign workers to the region.

Once the war ends there will no doubt be a concerted, and well-funded, campaign to rebuild reputations, but this is unlikely to succeed overnight and one potential negative impact on the British economy is that this could lessen the amount of inward investment destined for Britain from the Middle East. One likely upside of peace once it is achieved is that regional airlines will unquestionably be offering highly competitive fares to attract wary but price sensitive customers back.

The intense phase of the conflict could have ended by the time of my next monthly blog, although that’s by no means a racing certainty. However, the fallout from it is set to last for several months at the very least, and sadly for Britain’s visitor economy the downside risks firmly outweigh the upside risks.